Prosperity & Violence: The Political Economy of Development - Robert H. Bates

Prosperity & Violence: The Political Economy of Development. Written by one Robert H. Bates. He's an economist and political scientist by trade. Distinguished professor at Harvard University. Published in 1981, the book has since been revised and reprinted several times and is regularly read in college political science classes. 

This is a pretty difficult little book. I read it in college. I know because it had notes in my handwriting written in the margins. However, I can’t recall this at all. Probably for a political science class, I assume, maybe a developing democracy or a consolidating a dictator ship course I took. This had to be one of the less memorable things we read for whichever was the case.

That said, the gist is that economic development is not solely determined by factors such as natural resources or culture, but rather by the interplay between economic and political institutions. Sort of at odds with Jared Diamond, I guess you could say. Bates, for his part, argues that societies with inclusive and flexible institutions, such as competitive markets and responsive governments, are more likely to experience sustained economic growth and prosperity. On the other hand, societies with extractive and rigid institutions, such as monopolistic markets and authoritarian governments, are more likely to experience economic stagnation and violence. 

His big claim is that politics has always been about the use of violence, and has developed from there, but is still the state's main function. As he writes, “Those who engage in politics, rather than production, specialize in the use of violence. Most commonly, they use power to redistribute, not create, wealth. As acts of redistribution, often inflict losses, the use of force often destroys. For power to be used to produce wealth, coercion must therefore be used in new ways. Those who specialize in the use of force must refrain from violence and delegate their authority to those who will employ it productively. They must delegate it to those who specialize in combining land, labor, and capital in the process of production,” (p. 26). 

Bates supports this argument and others with case studies from various countries in Africa and Latin America, showing how their political and economic institutions have influenced their development trajectories. These were the most interesting parts of the book.

Also hints at a lot of economic hitman type work throughout, especially that done by the US government and Soviet Russia. Doesn't get specific but you know it is there. Stuff about taking out loans for infrastructure that developing counties couldn't pay back, eventually resulting in regime change, economic collapse, failed states, and so forth. My younger self was unaware of this phenomenon but was picking up on it. Notes read, “Why they keep borrowing? What happens to countries that can't pay back,” and so forth. 

Lot of the stuff about foreign meddling helping to usher in collapse gets glossed over. Example: “Creditors required the governments of developing nations to adopt policies that would lower the demand for imports, and thus ease the burden of paying for previous purchases from abroad. Cuts in government deficits, higher rates of interest, and lower levels of public spending—these and other measures lowered the level of domestic demand and thus the demand for imports, reducing the burden of foreign payments on the one hand, while on the other sparking policy-induced recessions,” (p. 90). “Seems like a real recipe for disaster,” I wrote circa 2002. Indeed, my younger guy. It's also insanely oversimplified. 

Anyway, the book has been widely influential in the fields of political economy and development studies, apparently. It has been praised for its rigorous analysis and insightful arguments, hence it's near required reading for poli-sci students. I liked it and found it interesting though it is written in academic speak and is at times guilty of oversimplifying complex issues. It also ignores the role of external factors such as globalization and international institutions when discussing the failed states.

He ends the book with the famous Thomas Hobbes quote, that says, “the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” Of it, Bates says, “[Hobbes] words disturb because they respond to much that is felt and seen in the present day, when, for too many in the developing world, insecurity remains the norm and development a dream that cruelly eludes their grasp,” (p. 115). To me, it seems that Bates is unwilling to blame developed countries like the US for sacrificing the prosperity of others for their own. That's just me doe.